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The EU Multifaceted Crisis
European Structural Power on the Wane? 
EU Foreign Policy between External and 
Internal Challenges
David Cadier1
Centre de Recherches Internationales  
CERI - Sciences Po, Paris
The European Union’s (EU) foreign policy software 
needs updating: it appears to be increasingly out of 
sync with the operating system of international poli-
tics. At the turn of the millennium, many had hoped 
that the EU’s internal model and institutional nature 
– as a transnational multilateral governance platform 
based on international law and soft power – would 
make it well prepared for, and even a potential leader 
in, the world to come (Howorth, 2010). Yet, post-
modern Europe has not seen the advent of the kind 
of post-Westphalian international system it had hoped 
for. Instead, the EU finds itself rather ill-equipped in 
the new era of great-power competition. Its distinc-
tive approach to foreign policy, which has mainly 
consisted in the export of democratic governance 
and economic standards, is increasingly under strain 
at a time where it is both tested externally and con-
tested internally.
This adaptation challenge is indeed made pressing 
by the evolving international context, as the EU and its 
Member States need not only to develop the means 
to pursue their interests globally, but also to push 
back against the growing tendency of world powers 
to encroach on Europe’s sovereignty (Leonard and 
Shapiro, 2019). Russia has taken the conflict over the 
geopolitical and geo-economic orientation of coun-
tries of the post-Soviet space from the Donbas to EU 
Member States’ domestic politics and informational 
spheres. China has invested in strategic chunks of 
European economies and has acquired, as such, sig-
nificant political leverage. The United States is ex-
ploiting its position as Europe’s vital security provid-
er to advance its economic and energy interests on 
the continent and beyond. More profoundly, under 
the Trump Administration, the US has increasingly 
brought into question some of the core principles of 
the international liberal order, of which it had been 
the main guarantor and which the EU still regards as 
the legitimate architecture of world politics. 
The erosion of the ruled-based order and the pres-
sure applied by external powers on Europe’s sover-
eignty constrains its ability to tackle the many security 
crises and risks present in its neighbourhood, from 
Ukraine to Syria and from Iran to Bosnia. 
The EU’s capacity to face off these mounting exter-
nal challenges, resist geopolitical pressures and fos-
ter peace and security in its neighbourhood will, in-
deed, largely be mediated by its internal cohesion 
and resilience. Several recent internal developments 
are undermining both these aspects. In addition to 
potentially depriving the bloc of some of the UK’s 
strategic assets, Brexit is reverting the basis of what 
had been the vector of the EU’s transformative pow-
er, namely enlargement or enlargement-lite. The ref-
ugee crisis showcased and deepened Europe’s in-
ternal divisions and some of the policy responses (or 
lack thereof) cast a shadow on its soft power. The 
rise of populist political forces, who have made it to 
power in several EU Member States, has led to an 
over-prioritization of domestic politics over European 
compromise-building, as well as, in some instants, 
an erosion of the very rule of law norms and stand-
ards that the EU purports to promote abroad. All of 
1 This article builds on research conducted in the framework of EULISTCO, a collaborative research project that has received funding from the 
European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement no. 769886. The article solely reflects the au-
thor’s views.
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these internal developments tend to put pressure on 
what had been the EU’s core, structural power strat-
egy in external relations. 
EU Foreign Policy and Its Limits in the New 
World (Dis)order
The EU disposes of a wide array of foreign policy 
tools, from military missions and economic sanctions 
to trade instruments, development aid and visa-free 
regimes. These tools can be put to use to handle rela-
tions with other international actors or to manage cri-
ses, but EU foreign policy is more profoundly about 
shaping (or attempting to shape) the political, eco-
nomic, social and legal structures in which states and 
societies evolve and interact – to the extent that 
some authors have talked of “structural foreign poli-
cy” or of the EU as a “structural power” (Keukeleire 
and Delreux, 2014). To protect and advance the in-
terests, security and prosperity of its Member States 
and their citizens, and to influence actors and out-
comes in its region and beyond, the EU seeks to pro-
mote certain norms, standards and organizing princi-
ples. In other words, EU foreign policy is largely about 
exporting the EU’s internal model to its external envi-
ronment and, especially, its immediate neighbour-
hood. It is about shaping the structures of regional 
and international politics in the sense of its own con-
stituting principles of multilateral legal order, demo-
cratic governance and free market economy.
In that sense, speaking of the EU as a “normative pow-
er” does not refer to it taking principled positions or 
“doing good,” but rather to its tendency to rely on 
norms as a currency of foreign policy. Promoting and 
exporting legal, political, economic and administra-
tive norms to its neighbourhood through institution-
building or institutional support is not just the vector 
of EU structural power, it is also a default solution for 
the EU, as adherence to these norms and principles 
is what unites and reunites Member States, while in-
terests tend to be more specific and national. Put 
bluntly, rule of law principles are what EU Member 
States agree on and can rally around, much more than 
threat perceptions or economic interests. The EU re-
mains, above all, a multi-level governance structure, 
meant to foster compromise and generate consen-
sus among its Member States, and its foreign poli-
cy is not discharged of this task. As such, generating 
consensus among Member States represents both a 
condition for, and a goal of, EU foreign policy making. 
This has sometimes led the process of collective ac-
tion to be regarded as being more important than ac-
tual outcome and impact. 
To promote or support norms, organizing principles 
and institutions, the EU’s most comprehensive instru-
ment has been the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP). The two regions generally designated as the 
eastern and southern neighbourhood have, indeed, 
been the most important for EU structural power ob-
jectives and in terms of EU foreign policy priorities.2 
The ENP aims to foster political, economic and ad-
ministrative reforms in the countries bordering the 
EU by offering a series of financial, trade and mobil-
ity incentives. It largely relies on the evaluation tools, 
conditionality logic and even personnel of the enlarge-
ment policy, yet without offering the main and crucial 
incentive of EU membership. In that sense, the ENP 
not only incarnates the spearhead of EU foreign pol-
icy, it also incarnates some of its structural flaws, 
namely institutional path-dependency and an inabil-
ity to go beyond the enlargement template. 
The basis and patterns of EU foreign policy described 
above increasingly find themselves challenged in the 
emerging international context. This was maybe most 
evident in Ukraine, where Russia heavily pushed 
back against EU structural power by using economic 
coercion to deter Kiev from signing a free trade agree-
ment with Brussels (Cadier, 2014). Vladimir Putin is, 
rather paradoxically, one of the few world leaders to 
have explicitly referred to the EU’s “normative pow-
er,” but to describe it as it as a threat. In the face of 
the uncertainties surrounding Ukraine’s geopolitical 
orientation brought upon by the fall of the Yanuko-
vych regime, Russia eventually annexed Crimea and 
fostered armed rebellion in Eastern Ukraine. Thus, 
the EU went from negotiating a free trade agree-
ment with Ukraine to “sleepwalking” into a geopo-
litical conflict with Russia, failing to read regional 
dynamics or anticipate Russia’s reaction by relying 
2 The 16 countries included in the ENP are: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, 
Morocco, Syria, Palestine, Tunisia and Ukraine.
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on an overly technical, institutional and inward-look-
ing approach (Haukkala, 2016). 
The EU’s structural foreign policy has hit walls in 
other regions as well. In the southern neighbour-
hood, state and non-state actors have sought to cir-
cumvent EU normative power or have challenged 
the political and economic systems in place, includ-
ing those built around the organizing principles sup-
ported by the EU. More profoundly, the EU’s struc-
tural foreign policy reaches its limit when confronted 
with “areas of limited statehood,” that is, to zones 
where there is no central authority able to control 
the monopoly of violence, deliver public goods and 
implement or enforce the governance norms that 
the EU seeks to export (Börzel and Risse, 2018 ). 
At the global level, by pulling out of non-proliferation 
and the global commons framework, such as the 
Iran deal or the Paris climate deal, and by contesting 
the legitimacy of international organizations, such as 
the World Trade Organization or UNESCO, the US 
feeds into this trend of contesting established rule-
based orders. 
In the southern neighbourhood, state 
and non-state actors have sought to 
circumvent EU normative power
The growing proclivity of Russia, China and the US 
to put their geopolitical weight behind contesting 
the norms, principles and institutions that the EU 
had sought to promote in its neighbourhood and, to 
a lesser extent, across the globe places important 
constraints on its structural foreign policy. This ap-
proach is, in addition, undermined by several internal 
developments. 
Brexit and the Spectre of Dis-enlargement 
It seems hard to gauge the potential effects of Brex-
it on EU foreign policy as the process is still ongoing 
and the concrete outcome still unknown. Referring 
to other policy areas and to the UK’s lukewarm en-
gagement and numerous opt-outs, some have sug-
gested that the consequences of seeing the UK 
leave the Union might, in fact, be limited. This may be 
most eloquently incarnated by the bon mot of former 
MEP Jean-Louis Bourlanges, who quipped that, be-
fore Brexit, the UK had one foot in and one foot out 
of the Union while, after Brexit, it will be the other 
way around. Things are, however, set to look some-
how different for foreign policy.
The UK has undeniably been one of the Union’s for-
eign policy heavyweights: its departure will deprive 
the bloc of its diplomatic, economic and military re-
sources and this is bound to undermine the EU’s in-
ternational clout (Hill, 2019). London has one of the 
broadest diplomatic networks in the world, holds a 
permanent seat at the UN Security Council and re-
tains privileged strategic ties in the Commonwealth 
and with the US. The UK has been the second big-
gest economy in the EU, the fourth largest contribu-
tor to the EU’s budget and a key purveyor of devel-
opment aid around the globe. Lastly, the UK is, along 
with France, one of only two powers in the EU capa-
ble of rapidly and consequentially projecting military 
force and holding a nuclear deterrent.
Interestingly though, several analysts argue that the 
UK’s formal departure might not overly affect the 
outputs of EU security and defence policy and, may-
be, not even London’s contribution to this policy. 
They notably anticipate that, since “Global Britain” is 
more a rhetorical device than a feasible strategy and 
as London will seek to overcome its damaged cred-
ibility and make up for lost institutional ties, the UK 
will retain major incentives to continue collaborating 
with – and maintaining its commitments to – other 
European countries in the fields of defence and se-
curity (Martill and Sus, 2018). If anything, one of the 
concrete impacts of Brexit has been, not the demise, 
but the acceleration of EU defence integration (al-
beit modest), notably through initiatives such as the 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) or the 
European Defence Fund. In addition, with Brexit, 
London has set a precedent but not an example. Con-
trary to what many had feared, there seems to be no 
“domino effect.” Seeing the UK leaving the EU has 
not led other governments or political forces to fol-
low or advocate the same path for their country. On 
the contrary, in the recent campaign for the Europe-
an parliamentary elections many populist parties ac-
tually amended their rhetoric and political strategy 
from leaving to transforming the EU from within. 
Brexit risks, however, constraining the EU’s structural 
foreign policy and diminishing its structural power. 
K
ey
s
T
he
 E
U
 M
ul
ti
fa
ce
te
d 
C
ri
si
s
IE
M
ed
. M
ed
ite
rr
an
ea
n 
Ye
ar
bo
ok
 2
01
9
35
Notably with reference to the waves of 2004 and 
2007, enlargement is generally dubbed the EU’s 
“greatest foreign policy success.” Yet, except maybe 
for the Western Balkans and only in the medium to 
long-term, the EU’s enlargement policy has stalled, 
or is perhaps even dead. Some of the negative exter-
nalities of the recent waves of enlargement have al-
ready cast a shadow on the policy: the accession of 
Cyprus led to a paralysis of EU-NATO cooperation, 
the European Commission had to suspend EU fund-
ing to Bulgaria as reforms were incomplete, and there 
is, more generally, a realization, in the face of recent 
rule of law violations by Hungary or Poland, that EU 
institutions are rather helpless when a Member State 
that has already joined decides to do away with the 
EU’s core principles. Brexit seems bound to be yet 
another nail in the coffin of the EU’s enlargement 
policy: not only was the UK the Member State most 
supportive of the process, but Brexit signals more 
profoundly a reversal of what had been the EU’s main 
foreign policy dynamic. This dynamic had run its 
course by many accounts, but there is nevertheless 
a strong symbol in seeing the EU, for the first time, 
not enlarge but shrink. 
The Refugee Crisis and Europe’s Normative 
Fracture
In 2015, the number of migrants – whether refugees 
fleeing wars, economic migrants or asylum seek-
ers – reached unprecedented proportions, nearing 
1.3 million. While such influx, displacements and re-
location of populations certainly comes with com-
plex human, logistical and societal issues, it is also 
the lack or uncoordinated nature of policy responses 
that contributed to turning the refugee crisis into an 
EU crisis. As emphasized by Anne-Marie Le Gloan-
nec, this crisis has “demonstrated the paralysis of EU 
institutions and national governments, undermined 
solidarity between Member States and gnawed at the 
democratic fabric of Europe” (Le Gloannec, 2018). 
The Bulgarian political analyst Ivan Krastev went as 
far as labelling it “Europe’s 9/11.” 
Some of the root causes of the EU’s failures in han-
dling the refugee influx originate in foreign policy 
shortcomings. The EU and its Member States had 
largely sought to delegate the management of the 
bloc’s external borders to neighbouring countries. 
As such, their migration policies often found them-
selves at the mercy of the whims and deficits of unsta-
ble governments or authoritarian regimes. More pro-
foundly, the political crisis around migration revealed 
and deepened fractures in and between European 
states and societies. It crystallized certain divisions 
into entrenched polarizations, between South and 
North (along lines already drawn by the euro crisis), 
and more acutely between East and West. 
While it has failed to maintain cohesion and have a 
decisive imprint at the EU level on foreign policy dos-
siers of importance to central Europe (such as Rus-
sia or energy security), the Visegrad Group found its 
unity and negatively emerged as a political force in 
Europe around the rejection of refugee relocation 
schemes, which they saw as being forced upon them 
by western Europe (Kazharski, 2018). The migrant 
crisis has, indeed, “laid bare a widespread percep-
tion across central and eastern Europe that western 
Europe (and hence the EU) is trying to force on them 
a multicultural model of society which in their eyes 
has ‘entirely failed’” (Rupnik, 2016). A concrete po-
litical consequence of the crisis has been that popu-
lations in the region now place more faith in their na-
tional governments than in the EU, while the opposite 
was true before 2015 (Krastev, 2017).
The crisis did not only bring a fragmentation of – and 
fractures in – European polities and societies, but 
also led to a growing contestation of the model un-
derpinning the EU’s normative power and, thereby, 
to its weakening. Essentially, national governments 
found themselves torn between, on the one hand, 
international norms and obligations and, on the other 
hand, national conditions, historical experiences, eco-
nomic resources and societal resilience (Le Gloan-
nec, 2018)- and they clearly prioritized the latter. 
The albeit temporary reinstatement of borders among 
Schengen countries cast a shadow on the free move-
ment of persons, one of the EU’s core founding prin-
ciples. The refugee crisis and its mishandling also 
created a political climate detrimental to any form of 
population mobility coming from outside the EU, and 
yet such mobility is one of the main vectors of the 
EU’s structural power in its neighbourhood, as tes-
tified by the leverage gained through the granting 
of visa-free regimes. More profoundly, many saw 
the migrant crisis and its consequences as a mani-
festation that the West’s (and Europe’s) “ambition 
to export its values and institutions has resulted in a 
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profound identity crisis in Western societies” (Krastev, 
2017). Populist parties have been feeding off this 
identity crisis. 
The Rise of Populism and Contradictions 
of Illiberal Foreign Policy 
In recent years, the rise of populism has moved from 
being, simply, a trend in domestic and electoral poli-
tics, to becoming, in addition, a foreign policy matter. 
Populist parties have indeed risen to power in sev-
eral EU Member States – such as Hungary, Austria, 
Poland or Italy – and thus hold the reins of their 
countries’ European and foreign policies. This is to 
such an extent that, in the face of this trend, analysts 
are endeavouring to picture how an “illiberal Europe” 
might (or might not) work (Grabbe and Lehne, 2018). 
To anticipate the concrete implications that the advent 
of populist governments might have on EU foreign 
policy, there is no need to engage in scenario-build-
ing or prospective analysis, however. It is sufficient to 
consider how those already in office have handled na-
tional foreign policy making. 
Contrary to how sensationalist (or partisan) claims 
might have it, populist governments do not adopt 
reckless, devil-may-care attitudes in international af-
fairs, nor necessarily bring about revolutionary chang-
es in foreign policy. In spite of their radical political 
rhetoric at home, Hungary’s Viktor Orban and Italy’s 
Matteo Salvini have not fundamentally altered their 
countries’ positions in NATO or towards Russia. In 
addition, populists do not adopt distinctive or com-
mon ideas when it comes to foreign policy.3 Populist 
parties from the far left and the far right tend, for in-
stance, to disagree on migration or military opera-
tions abroad, but they respectively share some views 
on these dossiers with various mainstream parties. 
Similarly, several populist parties display pro-Rus-
sian preferences, although this is not the case of Po-
land’s Law and Justice party, which, on the contrary, 
is one of the most confrontational towards Moscow. 
The fact that populist parties do not appear overly 
committed to certain ideas in foreign affairs is exem-
plified by their readiness to strike rather improbable 
diplomatic alliances – such as between Orban and 
Salvini on migration – or to adopt temporary stances 
which contradict their long-standing positions – such 
as when the former Polish Foreign Minister Witold 
Waszczykowski threatened to veto Ukraine’s (future 
and hypothetical) accession to the EU. 
More than their ideas, what is distinctive of populists 
in foreign policy is their style (Cadier, 2019). Wheth-
er understood as an ideology, a discourse or a strat-
egy, populism can be understood as a political logic 
that sees society as being fundamentally structured 
by an opposition between a “pure people” and a “cor-
rupt elite.” This translates into anti-pluralist and anti-
elitist postures, as well as into a tendency to perceive 
policy making as a common-sense application of 
common will (Müeller, 2016). This political practice 
spills over into foreign policy in several ways. 
More than their ideas, what is 
distinctive of populists in foreign 
policy is their style
First, populists’ anti-pluralism often leads them to re-
gard foreign policy as the continuation of domestic 
politics by other means, that is as a way either to at-
tack their current political opposition or to distin-
guish themselves from the previous government. Not 
only did Poland’s Law and Justice make the country 
the only Member State that opposed Donald Tusk’s 
re-election as President of the European Council, its 
Foreign Minister went as far as denouncing the elec-
tion as being “rigged.”4 Second, populists’ distinctive 
communication style, their anti-elitism and claim to 
conduct foreign policy in the name of “the people,” 
often leads them to disregard diplomatic codes and 
norms and to overlook diplomatic expertise. Matteo 
Salvini’s diplomacy is, in this regard, a case in point. 
Third, to elude the contradiction of becoming them-
selves the “elites” by acceding to power, populists 
claim that old or foreign elites are (still) active behind 
the scene, which leads them to indulge in conspira-
cy theories. For instance, in the summer of 2017, the 
former Polish Defence Minister Antoni Macierewicz 
described the student protests against his govern-
3 See: Verbeek and Zaslove, 2015; Dennison and Pardijs, 2016.
4 “Poland fumes at ‘cheating’ EU for keeping Donald Tusk in top post,” The Guardian, 13 March 2017. 
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ment’s reform of the justice system as a “hybrid war” 
being waged against his country. 
This peculiar populist style in foreign policy making 
could have implications both for the process and the 
substance of EU foreign policy (Cadier, 2019). On 
the one hand, by over-prioritizing domestic politics 
and by showing a proclivity for “undiplomatic” diplo-
macy and conspiracy theories, governing populist 
parties risk further complicating consensus-seeking 
and compromise-building at the EU level. Yet, EU 
Member States’ ability to act collectively – and the 
mere possibility of an EU foreign policy – depends 
precisely on this process. On the other hand, the 
fact that some EU Member States bring into ques-
tion some of the rule of law standards and norms of 
democratic governance at home risks weakening 
the EU’s legitimacy in exporting them. As such, may-
be even more than Brexit or the refugee crisis, the 
rise of populism is likely to cast a shadow on the 
EU’s structural power.
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